



Turning negative memories around
Citation for published version (APA):
Dibbets, P., Lemmens, A., & Voncken, M. (2018). Turning negative memories around: Contingency versus
devaluation techniques. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry, 60, 5-12.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2018.02.001





Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record
Document license:
Taverne
Please check the document version of this publication:
• A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can
be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record.
People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication,
or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
• The final author version and the galley proof are versions of the publication after peer review.




Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these
rights.
• Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research.
• You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
• You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal.
If the publication is distributed under the terms of Article 25fa of the Dutch Copyright Act, indicated by the “Taverne” license above,
please follow below link for the End User Agreement:
www.umlib.nl/taverne-license
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us at:
repository@maastrichtuniversity.nl
providing details and we will investigate your claim.
Download date: 02 Nov. 2021
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jbtep
Turning negative memories around: Contingency versus devaluation
techniques☆
Pauline Dibbets∗, Anke Lemmens, Marisol Voncken
Maastricht University, The Netherlands





Eye movement desensitization and
reprocessing
Reinstatement
A B S T R A C T
Background and objectives: It is assumed that fear responses can be altered by changing the contingency between
a conditioned stimulus (CS) and an unconditioned stimulus (US), or by devaluing the present mental re-
presentation of the US. The aim of the present study was to compare the efficacy of contingency- and deva-
luation-based intervention techniques on the diminishment in – and return of fear. We hypothesized that ex-
tinction (EXT, contingency-based) would outperform devaluation-based techniques regarding contingency
measures, but that devaluation-based techniques would be most effective in reducing the mental representation
of the US. Additionally, we expected that incorporations of the US during devaluation would result in less
reinstatement of the US averseness.
Methods: Healthy participants received a fear conditioning paradigm followed by one of three interventions:
extinction (EXT, contingency-based), imagery rescripting (ImRs, devaluation-based) or eye movement desensi-
tization and reprocessing (EMDR, devaluation-based). A reinstatement procedure and test followed the next day.
Results: EXT was indeed most successful in diminishing contingency-based US expectancies and skin con-
ductance responses (SCRs), but all interventions were equally successful in reducing the averseness of the mental
US representation. After reinstatement EXT showed lowest expectancies and SCRs; no differences were observed
between the conditions concerning the mental US representation.
Limitations: A partial reinforcement schedule was used, resulting in a vast amount of contingency unaware
participants. Additionally, a non-clinical sample was used, which may limit the generalizability to clinical po-
pulations.
Conclusion: EXT is most effective in reducing conditioned fear responses.
1. Introduction
During fear conditioning a neutral stimulus is repeatedly paired
with an aversive event (unconditioned stimulus, US). As result of these
pairings, the neutral stimulus becomes a conditioned stimulus, CS,
signaling the occurrence of the US. Subsequent CS presentations then
result in a preparatory response (conditioned response, CR). Although
these anticipatory responses might foster survival, they may become a
source of psychopathology in case they persist in the absence of any
threat.
Conditioning has been put forward as a powerful theoretical fra-
mework to explain the etiology and maintenance of fear, but also
provides points of action for fear reduction. For example, exposure
therapy is a highly effective treatment method to diminish a condi-
tioned fear response through extinction (Abramowitz, 2013). During an
extinction procedure the CS is repeatedly presented in the absence of
the US resulting in a diminishment of the CR. Similarly, during ex-
posure a client is confronted with a feared stimulus or situation until
the accompanying fear response has been extinguished (Öst, 1996,
1997, 1989).
Several studies have demonstrated that associative learning can
occur even if the CS and US are not physically present (e.g., Field,
2006). For instance, pairing an actual CS with a mentally imagined US
can result in a CR upon subsequent CS presentations. Likewise, a
mentally imagined CS can elicit CRs after being paired with an actual
US (Dadds, Bovbjerg, Redd, & Cutmore, 1997). Even more, imagining a
CS—US combination, for example imagining a violent dog attacking
you, can result in a conditioned fear response. Vice versa, mentally ex-
posing yourself to a feared situation can result in fear reductions (e.g.,
desensitization, Lang & Lazovik, 1963). In sum, these studies indicate
that mental experiences with CSs and USs can affect conditioned re-
sponding.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbtep.2018.02.001
Received 14 September 2017; Received in revised form 11 December 2017; Accepted 5 February 2018
☆ The research was conducted at Maastricht University.
∗ Corresponding author. Faculty of Psychology and Neuroscience, Clinical Psychological Science, Maastricht University, P.O. box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, The Netherlands.
E-mail address: Pauline.dibbets@maastrichtuniversity.nl (P. Dibbets).
Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 60 (2018) 5–12
Available online 13 February 2018
0005-7916/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
T
Davey (1997) poses a model in which the strength of the CS—US
association not solely depends on the number of CS—US pairings. Ac-
cordingly, two processes influence the strength of the CR: expectancy
evaluation and US revaluation. The first process concerns the influence
of the (expected) contingency between the CS and US on the CR. This
process not only reflects direct CS—US experiences, but also reflects
expectancy biases, pre-existing beliefs or transmitted information about
the CS—US association (e.g., Askew, Kessock-Philip, & Field, 2008;
Muris, Bodden, Merckelbach, Ollendick, & King, 2003). The second
process, US revaluation, indicates that the mental representation of the
US is vulnerable to changes, even if the US itself is not presented. So-
cially or verbally transmitted information about the US can inflate or
devaluate the mental US representation, resulting in, respectively, an
increased or decreased CR upon subsequent CS presentations (Davey,
1997; Field, 2006).
The model of Davey (1997) provides several ways to reduce a
conditioned fear response. First, contingency-based procedures should
affect the strength of the CR. Indeed, extinction or exposure procedures
are known to diminish fearful responding. Likewise, a devaluation of
the (mental) representation can diminish CRs (Davey, 1989, 1997).
Indeed, several studies have indicated that devaluation of the (mental)
representation can result in decreased CRs (Dibbets, Poort, & Arntz,
2012). Haesen and Vervliet (2015) explicitly tested the assumption that
a conditioned fear response is a combination of the expected probability
and estimated intensity of the US. Their results supported this notion.
That is, a switch in context after extinction resulted in renewed US
expectancies and skin conductance responses (SCRs), whereas a context
switch after US devaluation (habituation) only increased US ex-
pectancies, but not SCRs. These results support the dual route model
posed by Davey (1989, 1997).
Several therapeutic techniques also explicitly tap on this US re-
valuation procedure, for example imagery rescripting (ImRs) and eye
movement desensitization and reprocessing (EMDR). ImRs has been
successfully applied in several mental disorders, such as posttraumatic
stress disorder (PTSD), personality disorders, social phobia, and de-
pression (Arntz, 2012). During ImRs a person is instructed to mentally
relive the aversive event and, next, to change the course of events in a
more desired direction (Arntz, 2012). By providing (corrective) in-
formation the mental representation of the aversive event is modified.
For example, a victim of an aggressive dog attack is asked to mentally
relive the aversive event. Subsequently, the person is encouraged to
change the course of events by letting the owner leashing the dog
during the attack and, as a result, the person has only minor injuries.
This altered memory is then retrieved on subsequent occasions, redu-
cing the fear response.
The second technique that is thought to tap on the mental re-
presentation of the aversive event is EMDR. EMDR is used to alleviate
negative memories and to treat PTSD (Schubert & Lee, 2009). During
EMDR a person recalls a traumatic memory while simultaneously
making horizontal eye movements (e.g., tracking the therapist's index
finger moving from left to right). Subsequent recollection of the trau-
matic memory is then less vivid and emotional (van den Hout &
Engelhard, 2012). Several models have evolved explaining the working
mechanism of EMDR. The most supported hypothesis is that EMDR
operates by taxing working memory during recall. During recall part of
the aversive memory is activated and temporarily located in working
memory (WM) (Baddeley, 2003). WM has limited capacity and when
two tasks that each tax WM are simultaneously carried out, they com-
pete for this limited capacity. Importantly, it is hypothesized that
during recall a memory becomes ‘labile’, meaning that events during
recall influence how the memory is reconsolidated and retrieved in the
future (Nader, 2003). As during EMDR the taxation of working memory
is thought to result in a less vivid and emotional image, this image is
then reconsolidated and recalled on subsequent occasions (see for more
hypotheses van den Hout & Engelhard, 2012).
Although both ImRs and EMDR both devaluate the aversive event,
their working mechanisms are thought to differ. During ImRs the
meaning of the memory is changed according to the needs of the person
(Arntz, Tiesema, & Kindt, 2007); while EMDR is thought to change the
emotionality and vividness of the memory (Leer, Engelhard, & van den
Hout, 2014). However, inherent to the latter technique is that re-
encountering the aversive event should result in the reinstatement of
the affective components of the memory. In case of ImRs the meaning of
the aversive event is changed, making it less vulnerable to reinstate-
ment effects.
While the initial acquisition of fear and its subsequent reduction
have been extensively examined, to our knowledge no study has com-
pared the efficacy of contingency-versus devaluation-based therapeutic
procedures in attempting to reduce fear. Based on the model of Davey
(1997) both methods should be effective in reducing a conditioned fear
response. However, extinction should explicitly address the US ex-
pectancy upon CS presentation, whereas EMDR and ImRs should affect
the value of the mental representation of the US. Additionally, EMDR
might be more vulnerable upon unexpected US presentations (i.e. re-
instatement) than ImRs as it reinstates the affective components of the
original memory, whereas during ImRs the rescripted memory remains
available. The main aim of the present study is to disentangle the effects
of contingency-versus devaluation-based interventions by comparing




One-hundred and five students (86 females, 19 males) with a mean
age of 21.50 years (SD=2.58) participated. They were randomly al-
located to the extinction (EXT, n=37), EMDR (EMDR, n=34), or
rescripting (ImRs, n=34) condition. Participation was rewarded with
study credits or a voucher of 10 euros. The experiment was approved by
the local ethical committee (ECP161 03-06-2015_A2) and carried out in
line with the declaration of Helsinki (Williams, 2008).
2.2. Material
2.2.1. Stimuli fear conditioning
Three black and white illustrations of kitchen utilities served as CSs:
a chef's hat, a sieve, and a ladle. The fourth stimulus, a colander, was
used as practice and filler stimulus. The role of the CSs was counter-
balanced across participants. A film clip picturing a kitchen accident
was presented (once) to embed the US (https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=-t_fUg0i9sI; duration 30 s, volume about 60 dB). The last 6 s
of this film clip, showing the female cook accidentally pouring a pan
with boiling water over herself, served as US during the conditioning
experiment. To increase the aversiveness of the US the peak volume was
set at 105 dB (screaming of the cook). Using a multimodal film clip
enables assessment of complex associative fear memories and ther-
apeutic interventions such as ImRs and EMDR (Kunze, Arntz, & Kindt,
2015). The stimuli were presented on a computer screen via E-prime
software (Version 2.08, Psychology Software Tools, http://www.pstnet.
com).
2.2.2. Questionnaires
2.2.2.1. State-trait anxiety inventory dutch form Y (STAI-DY). The STAI-
DY was used to measure state and trait anxiety (Van der Ploeg, 1982).
The questionnaire consists of a trait (STAIT) and state (STAIS) subscale.
Each subscale comprises 20 items that can be answered on four-point
scales (from ‘almost never’ to ‘almost always’, total score 20–80). In the
present study Cronbach's alpha for the STAIT and STAIS were,
respectively, .91 and .84.
2.2.2.2. Modified differential emotions scale (mDES). The mDES consists
P. Dibbets et al. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 60 (2018) 5–12
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of 16 items measuring different aspects of emotion. Items can be rated
on a Likert scale ranging from one (not at all) to seven (very intense)
(Schaefer, Nils, Sanchez, & Philippot, 2010). A negative affect score
(mDESneg) was calculated by averaging the eight negative items (“sad,
downhearted, blue”; “angry, irritated, mad”; “fearful, scared, afraid”;
“anxious, tense, nervous”; “disgusted, turned off, repulsed”; “disdainful,
scornful, contemptuous”; “guilty, remorseful”; and “ashamed,
embarrassed”); the positive affect score (mDESpos) was calculated by
averaging the five positive items Five items (“joyful, happy, amused”;
“warm hearted, gleeful, elated”; “loving, affectionate, friendly”;
“moved”; and “satisfied, pleased”). Higher scores represented higher
levels of negative or positive emotions, respectively (cf. Geschwind,
Meulders, Peters, Vlaeyen, & Meulders, 2015).
2.2.2.3. Stimulus ratings
2.2.2.3.1. Film ratings. The total film was rated on pleasantness
(0–100 unpleasant to pleasant), valence (0–100, negative to positive)
and expectancy (0, unexpected, to 100, certainly expected).
2.2.2.3.2. US ratings. The 6 s clip accompanied by the loud
screaming (US) was rated on pleasantness and valence. Furthermore,
levels of arousal were measured (all measures: 0 to 100). From the
second rating on the change in evoked arousal was measured (0–100,
decrease to increase).
2.2.2.3.3. Mental US ratings. After recall five aspects of the mental
US representation were questioned: the amount of details and
vividness, the evoked tension and averseness, and the experienced
negativity. The scale ranged from 0 (not at all) to 100 (very).
2.2.3. Differential fear conditioning task
The fear conditioning task was carried out over two consecutive
days. Day one consisted of a practice phase, an acquisition phase and an
extinction/intervention phase. On day two, reinstatement took place.
For all phases, stimuli were randomly presented and stimulus order
varied across participants.
2.2.3.1. Practice phase. The practice phase consisted of three CS0 trials
to familiarize participants with the US expectancy ratings. CS0 and an
accompanying Visual Analogue Scale (VAS) were presented for
6000ms. The participant could indicate the US expectancy by
clicking on a scale ranging from “certainly not” to “certainly”. The
inter-trial interval varied between 7000 and 15000ms (M: 11000ms).
CS presentations and US expectancy ratings were identical for all phases
of the task.
2.2.3.2. Acquisition phase. During acquisition CS1, CS2 and CS3 were
all presented eight times. In six out of 8 trials CS1 and CS2 were
followed by the US; CS3 was never reinforced. The US was presented
directly after CS offset.
2.2.3.3. Extinction and intervention phase. During the first part of the
extinction phase CS0 and CS3 were each presented eight times.
Normally the non-reinforced CS- is part of the extinction session.
However, to prevent potential differences in (residual) association
strength before test, CS3 was presented in all conditions, separating
CS1 and CS3 in time for the extinction condition. Next, the extinction
condition (EXT) received 16 unreinforced CS1 presentations, whereas
the other conditions (ImRS and EMDR) received their intervention. CS2
was not presented in order to measure generalization effects of the
intervention at test. The intervention time was for all conditions
approximately 5min.
2.2.3.4. Reinstatement and test. During the reinstatement phase US was
presented once followed by two blocks of CS1, CS2 and CS3 trials (6 test
trials in total).
2.2.4. Interventions
2.2.4.1. EMD. During the EMDR intervention the participant vividly
recalled the most aversive image of the US while, at the same time,
following a horizontally moving light grey dot presented against a black
background (1 cycle per second). The participant received eight EMDR
trials, each lasting 24 s. Trials were spaced by 10 s breaks in which the
participant was encouraged to recall the aversive image.
2.2.4.2. ImRs. The participant received a written script about a
plausible course of events following the accident. In this script the
participant sooths the victim, cools her face with wet towels and a
medical team specialised in burn victims arrives. After skin grafts, the
victim recovers well. We explicitly included the US for two reasons.
Firstly, activation of the mental representation of the event is beneficial
for alterations in the (retrievability) of the memory (e.g., Ehlers et al.,
2002; Foa & Rothbaum, 1998). Secondly, presentation of the US during
the reinstatement phase should not affect its valence as the US is part of
the rescripted scene. After reading the script, the participant closed his/
her eyes, recalled the US and rescripted the memory by using
instructions presented via headphones. The rescripting was repeated
twice, resulting in three trials in total. Trials were separated by 5 s
breaks; each rescripting trial lasted about 64 s.
2.3. Procedure
See supplementary material for a flowchart. The participant filled in
the informed consent, STAIS and STAIT. Subsequently, the skin con-
ductance electrodes were attached and the participant watched and
rated the complete 30 s film clip (film ratings and mDES#1). Then, the
US (6 s, volume 105 dB) was presented via headphones and rated
(USrating#1). The experimenter guided the participant through the
practice phase and left the room. After the acquisition phase the par-
ticipant rated the US (USrating#2). Next, the experimenter encouraged
the participant to close his or her eyes and to vividly relive the US as if
it was happening at that particular moment with as many details as
possible and to rate this mental image (MentalUS#1). A second mDES,
concerning the mental US recall was answered (mDES#2) and the ex-
tinction/intervention phase was started. After the intervention the
participant mentally recalled and rated the US (MentalUS#2) and
completed the accompanying mDES (mDES#3).
The next day the participant returned (see for influence sleep on
extinction Pace-Schott, Germain, & Milad, 2015). The electrodes were
attached and the participant rated the recalled US (MentalUS#3), and
the emotional state concerning the mental US (mDES#4). The US and
reinstatement test were presented and the participant gave a final
rating of the mental representation of the US (MentalUS#4) and ac-
companying mDES (mDES#5). The participants were debriefed after
testing the last participant.
2.4. Data analyses
2.4.1. Expectancy and stimulus ratings
Expectancy ratings were transformed to percentages: 0% indicating
no US was expected and 100% that the US would certainly follow. The
ratings were averaged across two trials. Only participants that dis-
played discrimination learning during the acquisition (CS1 and CS2
ratings > CS3 ratings) were included in the data analyses. This selec-
tion was made as discrimination is a prerequisite for examining changes
in US expectancies at test.
2.4.2. Skin conductance response (SCR)
SCRs to the conditioned stimuli were analysed using Ledalab
(V3.2.4; http://www.ledalab.de). Pre-processing included smoothing (8
Gauss, convolution with a Hanning window) and down sampling to
10 Hz. Artefacts were manually traced and corrected using a spline
interpolation. Next, a continuous decomposition analysis was run,
P. Dibbets et al. Journal of Behavior Therapy and Experimental Psychiatry 60 (2018) 5–12
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optimizing the fit and reducing the error of the model (Benedek &
Kaernbach, 2010). Skin conductance responses were level-corrected by
subtracting the average skin conductance level of the preceding and
succeeding inter-stimulus intervals. Subsequently, event-related acti-
vation based on the event-locked markers was calculated by using the
largest deflection in conductance between 900 and 4000ms after the
stimulus onset (First Interval Response) with a minimum response of
.02 μs. The data were range corrected by dividing each participant's
SCR by her maximum response (Lykken & Venables, 1971), in this
experiment the highest US response (largest deflection 900–4000 after
US onset). A square root transformation was applied to normalize the
distribution (Siddle & Packer, 1987). The corrected SCRs were averaged
across two trials.
2.4.3. Statistical tests
The SCR, US expectancy ratings and stimulus ratings were analysed
using GLM repeated measures, with stimulus (CSs+ and CS-) and time
or trial block as within-subjects factors and intervention condition
(EXT, EMDR and ImRs) as between-subjects factor. In case of an in-
teraction effect, main effects are not reported. The standard rejection
criterion was set at p < .05 throughout.
3. Results
3.1. Included sample and missing values
Ten female participants dropped out during the experiment. One
due to equipment failure and nine indicated that the US was too
aversive. Nineteen participants were labelled as contingency unaware;
the remaining 76 participants were included in the data analyses. The
demographic information of the included sample and questionnaire
data are presented in Table 1. There was no difference between con-
ditions regarding age, STAIT, STAIS and initial CS ratings (CSrat-
ings#1), Fs < 1; neither did the gender ratio vary across conditions,
χ2 < 1.
3.2. Film and US measures
The total film was rated as unpleasant and negative, one sample t-
test, ts(75) < −8.85, ps < .001. The accident in the film was, prob-
ably due to instructions, expected, t(75)= 5.96, p < .001. A GLM re-
peated measures of the mood ratings after the film (mDESpos#1 and
mDESneg#1) indicated a more negative than positive mood, F(1,
73)= 20.65, p < .001, ηρ2= .22, no (interaction) effect of condition
was observed, Fs<1.36, ps> .26, ηρ2 < .036.
The US (6 s clip + loud scream of 105 dB) was rated (USrating#1)
as highly unpleasant, negative and startled the participant, |ts| >
14.74, ps < .001. No group differences regarding the film and US
measures were observed, Fs(2, 73)< 1.59, ps> .21. These results in-
dicate that the film and US were experienced as unpleasant.
3.3. Fear conditioning
3.3.1. US expectancy ratings
3.3.1.1. Acquisition. The acquisition and extinction data are presented
in Fig. 1. The GLM repeated measured revealed a stimulus x trial
interaction F(6, 438)= 103.11, p < .001, ηρ2= .59. GLMs per
stimulus indicated that, as expected, CS1 and CS2 ratings increased,
Fs(3, 225) > 41.66, ps < .001, ηρ2 > .35, and CS3 ratings decreased,
F(3, 255)= 73.00, p < .001, ηρ2= .49, across trial blocks. On the last
trial block, CS3 received lower US expectancy ratings compared to CS1
and CS2, ps < .001; no difference was observed between CS1 and CS2,
p= .70.
3.3.1.2. Extinction. The GLM of the EXT condition indicated that, as
expected, the CS1 ratings declined across trials, F(7, 168)= 33.58,
p < .001, ηρ2= .58.
3.3.1.3. Reinstatement. Fig. 2 depicts the US expectancy ratings during
the reinstatement for all three conditions. The GLM revealed a stimulus
x condition interaction, F(4, 146)= 4.95, p= .001, ηρ2= .12. An
ANOVA revealed only for CS1 an effect of condition, F(2, 73)= 5.07,
p= .009, no other effects were observed, Fs(2, 73)< 2.10, ps> .13.
Post-hoc tests indicated that the EXT condition gave lower US
expectancy ratings than the EMDR condition, p= .002, and
Table 1
Demographic information and mean scores (+SD) for the questionnaires and stimulus
ratings per condition.
EXT (n=25) ImRs (n=25) EMDR (n=26)
Age 21.68 (2.68) 21.44 (2.86) 21.08 (2.04)
m/f 4/21 5/20 7/19
STAIT 32.44 (6.04) 33.88 (5.64) 33.31 (7.46)
STAIS 39.04 (9.28) 37.60 (7.37) 39.15 (10.60)
Film ratings
Unpleasant 33.36 (24.09) 24.72 (19.19) 25.77 (21.57)
Negative 26.40 (23.39) 18.60 (15.85) 22.88 (221.73)
Unexpected 71.20 (30.29) 68.80 (25.56) 67.31 (28.68)
USratings#1
Pleasant 13.80 (21.66) 13.23 (29.65) 9.04 (16.85)
Valence 11.20 (13.94) 5.80 (9.09) 12.12 (16.62)
Startled 78.40 (22.11) 82.60 (19.53) 83.08 (13.57)
USratings#2
Pleasant 7.60 (14.51) 8.04 (20.84) 13.65 (23.35)
Valence 7.20 (11.00) 4.60 (7.63) 9.62 (17.08)
Change aversive 56.20 (29.27) 64.76 (24.15) 52.88 (26.16)
Change startle 45.60 (23.06) 52.80 (22.13) 43.08 (21.36)
Mental US ratings#1
Detail 68.60 (20.29) 72.00 (14.22) 69.85 (22.83)
Vividness 75.80 (15.12) 74.20 (17.54) 78.27 (13.63)
Tense 55.20 (21.19) 58.20 (22.40) 55.77 (25.95)
Unpleasant 64.80 (25.68) 64.00 (25.33) 61.15 (27.65)
Negative 73.00 (27.16) 79.88 (20.10) 75.96 (23.50)
Mental US ratings#2
Detail 53.40 (22.30) 62.80 (16.96) 62.96 (20.27)
Vividness 56.00 (21.84) 63.20 (22.68) 65.23 (17.36)
Tense 39.00 (24.15) 41.20 (25.55) 40.58 (24.26)
Unpleasant 45.60 (25.87) 47.32 (26.05) 45.19 (27.29)
Negative 56.80 (26.57) 58.52 (29.08) 63.65 (25.75)
Mental US ratings#3
Detail 55.40 (20.91) 58.80 (14.09) 61.15 (22.46)
Vividness 56.00 (18.99) 55.60 (18.95) 66.35 (17.53)
Tense 42.80 (20.57) 38.20 (21.93) 38.85 (23.85)
Unpleasant 46.20 (25.05) 50.20 (23.21) 49.23 (26.63)
Negative 61.40 (23.96) 63.20 (20.36) 65.19 (24.02)
Mental US ratings#4
Detail 71.00 (18.09) 68.40 (15.53) 71.15 (20.21)
Vividness 75.80 (15.66) 70.72 (18.96) 75.81 (17.78)
Tense 57.60 (20.42) 51.72(24.40) 49.62 (29.90)
Unpleasant 63.20 (24.23) 56.20 (25.43) 56.73 (28.88)
Negative 67.52 (26.35) 69.60 (24.06) 65.96 (27.06)
mDES ratings #1
Positive 2.10 (.89) 1.88 (.58) 2.09 (.74)
Negative 2.39 (.92) 2.67 (.81) 2.75 (1.05)
mDES ratings #2
Positive 1.74 (.49) 1.56 (.49) 1.75 (.59)
Negative 2.92 (1.00) 2.86 (.93) 2.92 (.99)
mDES ratings #3
Positive 1.58 (.70) 1.51 (.49) 1.56 (.46)
Negative 2.16 (.83) 1.97 (.68) 2.14 (.88)
mDES ratings #4
Positive 1.54 (.59) 1.28 (.31) 1.66 (.85)
Negative 2.08 (.81) 1.79 (.68) 1.95 (.88)
mDES ratings #5
Positive 1.58 (.66) 1.32 (.38) 1.51 (.55)
Negative 2.32 (.97) 1.98 (.79) 2.21 (1.00)
EXT=Extinction; ImRs= Imagery Rescripting; EMDR=Eye Movement Desensitization
and Reprocessing; STAIT = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory Trait subscale; STAIS = State-
Trait Anxiety Inventory State subscale; CS = Conditioned Stimulus; US = Unconditioned
Stimulus; mDES=Modified Differential Emotions Scale.
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marginally lower than the ImRs condition, p= .054; the ImRs and
EMDR groups did not differ, p= .24.
3.3.2. US ratings
The GLM of the US pleasantness ratings (USratings#1 and
USratings#2) revealed no effects, Fs< 2.22, ps> .11, ηρ2 < .058. The
GLM of the valence ratings yielded a main effect of time, F(1,
73)= 8.35, p= .005, ηρ2= .10, with the US becoming more negative
over time, indicating sensitization rather than habituation.
3.3.3. Mental US measures
3.3.3.1. Pre-versus post intervention
3.3.3.1.1. Mental US ratings. The mental representation of the US
was questioned before (MentalUS#1) and after (MentalUS#2) the
intervention. All aspects decreased, Fs(1, 73) > 25.86, ps < .001,
ηρ2 > .26, indicating that the mental US representation became
overall less aversive. No (interaction) effects of condition were
observed, Fs(2, 73)< 1.67, ps> .19, ηρ2 < .044.
3.3.3.1.2. MDES ratings. The GLM on the mood ratings (mDES#2
and mDES#3) revealed a significant interaction between type of mood
(positive or negative) and time, F(1, 73)= 64.87, p < .001, ηρ2= .47.
No (interaction) effects of condition were observed, Fs< 1.03,
ps> .36, ηρ2 < .028. Separate GLMs indicated that both the positive
and negative mood decreased over time, Fs(1, 75) > 9.18,
ps < .0034, ηρ2 > .11; both before and after the intervention more
negative than positive emotions were reported, Fs(1, 75) > 34.72,
ps < .001, ηρ2 > .31.
3.3.3.2. Day 2
3.3.3.2.1. Mental US ratings. The next day the mental US ratings
(MentalUS#3) did not differ from the previous day (MentalUS#2), Fs(1,
73)< 1.94, ps> .17, ηρ2 < .026, but remained significantly lower
compared to pre-intervention ratings, Fs(1, 73) > 30.80, ps < .001,
ηρ2 > .29. No main or interaction effects of condition were observed,
Fs< 2.00, ps> .14, ηρ2 < .052. After the reinstatement all aspects of
the US representation (MentalUS#4) increased compared to pre-
reinstatement ratings, Fs > 4.53, ps< .05, ηρ2> .058; no effect of
condition was observed, Fs< 1.95, ps> .14, ηρ2 < .051. This increase
was substantial and for most aspects the ratings did not differ from the
pre-intervention ratings (MentalUS#1), Fs(1, 73)< 1.68, ps> .20,
ηρ2 < .023. However, the memory was less negative, F(1,
73)= 15.41, p < .001, ηρ2= .17, and marginally more pleasant, F(1,
73)= 3.92, p= .051, ηρ2= .051, compared to the pre-intervention
ratings. No effects of condition were observed, Fs< 1.21, ps> .30,
ηρ2 < .032.
3.3.3.2.2. MDESratings. The GLM comparing post-intervention
(mDES#3) to the pre-reinstatement (mDES#4) mood ratings revealed
a main effect of emotion, F(1, 73)= 42.11, p < .001, ηρ2= .37, and
time, F(1, 73)= 4.58, p= .036, ηρ2= .059. Overall the negative mood
received higher ratings than positive mood and both emotional states
declined. No other (interaction) effects were observed, Fs< 1.14,
ps> .32, ηρ2 < .031. After reinstatement (mDES#5) the negative
mood strongly increased compared to pre-reinstatement ratings
(mdES#4), F(1, 73)= 15.30, p < .001, ηρ2= .17, whereas the
positive mood ratings remained low, F < 1. No effect of condition
was observed, Fs< 1.61, ps> .20, ηρ2 < .043. Although the
mDESneg#4 was less negative, F(1, 73)= 66.59, p < .001,
ηρ2= .48, and less positive, F(1, 73)= 20.98, p < .001, ηρ2= .22,
than the rating before the intervention (mDES#2).
3.3.4. Skin conductance response
3.3.4.1. Acquisition. The acquisition and extinction data are presented
in Fig. 3. The GLM repeated measures revealed a stimulus x trial block
interaction F(6, 420)= 3.90, p= .001, ηρ2= .053. No other
interaction effects were observed, Fs< 1.53, ps> .19, ηρ2 < .042.
Multiple comparisons indicated that during the first trial block CS1
evoked larger responses than CS2 and CS3, ps < .001, but that this
pattern changed so that during the last block CS1 did not differ from
CS2, p= .89, but they both showed increased responses compared to
CS3, ps < .030, indicating successful discrimination.
3.3.4.2. Extinction. A GLM repeated measures on the CS1 presentations
of the EXT group revealed a decline in SCRs across trials, F(7,
168)= 3.14, p < .005, ηρ2= .12.
3.3.4.3. Reinstatement. The reinstatement data are depicted in Fig. 4.
The data of two persons were not included in the reinstatement
analyses, one due to equipment failure the other due to movement
artefacts (total sample set n=74). The GLM repeated measures
revealed only a marginally significant effect of stimulus, F(2,
142)= 2.73, p= .068, ηρ2= .037, no other (interaction) effects were
Fig. 1. Mean US expectancy ratings and SEMs during the acquisition (left) and extinction (right).
Fig. 2. Mean US expectancy ratings and SEMs during the reinstatement test.
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observed, Fs< 2.37, ps> .10, ηρ2 < .063. Multiple comparisons
indicated that, in general, SCRs were larger for CS1 compared to CS3,
p= .016, and a tendency was observed, though not significant, for
larger CS2 than CS3 responses, p= .089. No differences were observed
between CS1 and CS2, p= .58.
As we were explicitly interested in possible differences between
conditions for CS1, CS2 and CS3, ANOVAs were carried out per sti-
mulus type. These analyses revealed an effect of condition for CS1, F(2,
71)= 3.32, p= .042, but not for CS2, F < 1, or CS3, F(2, 71)= 2.06,
p= .14. Multiple comparisons for CS1 indicated that SCRs were smaller
for the EXT condition compared to the ImRs, p= .015, and marginally
smaller than the EMDR condition, p= .077. No differences were ob-
served between ImRs and EMDR, p= .45.
4. Discussion
The aim of the present study was to examine three analogues of
well-known therapeutic interventions on the decrease in – and return of
fear using a fear conditioning paradigm. The exposure-like interven-
tion, EXT, addressed the contingency between the CS and US; the two
other interventions, ImRs and EMDR, aimed at devaluation of the
fearful event (film clip, US) itself. During ImRs the course of events
after the US was changed, whereas during EMDR the most aversive
scene of the US was used for the intervention. We hypothesized that
EXT would outperform ImRs and EMDR regarding the contingency-
based US expectancies, but that ImRs and EMDR would be more ef-
fective in reducing the averseness of mental representation of the US.
Additionally, we expected that after reinstatement the mental US re-
presentation would be less aversive in the ImRs condition, as the US
itself is part of the rescripted scene, compared to EMDR condition.
The results indicated that the US was experienced as highly aversive
and did not habituate over the acquisition. In fact, the US was valued
more negative after than before the acquisition phase, which is essential
as quick habituation of the US might hinder assessment of US deva-
luation techniques. As expected, during acquisition the reinforced CS1
and CS2 received higher US expectancy ratings than the non-reinforced
CS3. For the EXT condition, CS1 expectancies declined during the
subsequent extinction phase. The reinstatement results were in line
with our expectations and previous research on US devaluation (Haesen
& Vervliet, 2015). The contingency-based EXT intervention resulted in
lower US expectancy ratings upon CS1 presentations than the EMDR
condition and tended to be lower (p= .054) than the ImRs ratings.
Both EMDR and ImRs resulted in a decrease in the averseness of the
mental representation of the US. Recall after these interventions de-
clined the amount of details, vividness, evoked tension and averseness
of the US memory and a decrease in the negative emotions evoked by
recall. These results are in line with previous (experimental) results on
EMDR (Schubert & Lee, 2009; van den Hout & Engelhard, 2012) and
ImRs (Arntz, 2012). However, contrary to our expectations similar re-
sults were observed in the EXT group. While unexpected and although
the EXT group did not receive specific techniques to alter the mental
representation of the US, this observation might also be explained by
US devaluation. That is, CS1 presentations trigger the US representation
and the subsequent absence of the expected US during extinction
training may have weakened the sensory properties of the US re-
presentation, resulting in a diminished fear response (Rescorla & Heth,
1975; see for additional information; Vervliet, 2008; but see; Bouton &
Bolles, 1979). Likewise, repeated activation of the mental US pre-
sentation by the CS might also be considered as imaginal exposure,
which can also result in a decrease in (self-reported) fear (Hecker,
1990).
The reinstatement results indicated that most aspects of the mental
US representation returned to pre-intervention level, regardless of in-
tervention condition (see exp. 2 Storsve, McNally, & Richardson, 2012
for similar animal results of initial UR resinstament). The results were
expected for the EXT and EMDR condition, as re-experiencing the US
may strengthen the sensory properties of the US or re-establish the
original memory, respectively. However, we did not expect this for the
ImRs condition. In this condition the complete US was incorporated, the
script started after US offset. However, it might be the case that the
unexpected presentation of the US surprised the participant and that
the learned script was not available to devalue the renewed US pre-
sentation, though other researchers did find effects of positive re-
scripting on subsequent negative visual material (e.g., heart rate mea-
sures, Hagenaars, Mesbah, & Cremers, 2015). However, in the current
study a compound of visual and auditory aversive material was used.
Participants debriefed that especially the auditory component was
aversive. Though the scream might be part of the script, it is likely that
such an unpredictable and uncontrollable loud noise results in disrup-
tion of performance (Glass & Singer, 1972), making it hard to apply or
Fig. 3. Mean SCR and SEMs during the acquisition (left) and extinction (right) phase.
Fig. 4. Mean SCR and SEMs during the reinstatement test.
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retrieve the learned script.
The physiological data indicated that the reinforced CSs, CS1 and
CS2, evoked larger skin conductance responses than the non-reinforced
CS, CS0. During extinction CS1 responses declined. When we take a
look at the reinstatement data, we see that the EXT group tended to
display lower SCR than the other groups. This is in line with the notion
that contingency awareness coincides with conditioned SCRs (Weike,
Schupp, & Hamm, 2007; but see; Haesen & Vervliet, 2015). Indeed, the
EXT condition also displayed lower US expectancies during the re-
instatement than did the other conditions.
The model of Davey (1997) states that both US devaluation and
changes in contingency can result in diminished conditioned (fear) re-
sponses. The present study partly supports this model. We do see that
during the reinstatement the contingency-based US expectancy and
SCRs were most reduced in the EXT condition. However, contrary to
our expectations the aversive mental representation equally declined
across conditions. Though this might be explained by a weakening in
the sensory properties of the mental US representation (Rescorla &
Heth, 1975) or via imaginal exposure (Hecker, 1990) in the EXT group,
it does not explain the lack of effect between conditions after re-
instatement. However, one can argue that unexpectedly encountering
the US can result in sensitization of the US in all conditions, increasing
the conditioned response (Davey, 1997). To assess this possibility it
would be interesting for future research to test return of fear via a
change in context (Bouton, 2004). This would still enable the assess-
ment of contingency versus devaluation techniques, without presenting
the US again. However, in the present study we explicitly used the re-
instatement procedure as we thought it would allow for a differentia-
tion between EMDR and ImRs.
Before discussing the limitations, it is important to mention that the
participants were well able to carry out the ImRs and EMDR interven-
tions (see supplementary data). However, the procedures used are at
the same time one of the limitations. We used a predefined script and
the rate of the moving dot was set at a specific pace. This permits a
more direct comparison between experiment groups as the intervention
time was similar across conditions, but, at the same time, makes the
results less generalizable to a clinical setting. During therapy ImRs and
EMDR are tailor-made. A therapist helps to create a script, but does not
use a pre-recorded script. Likewise, the pace of a moving finger during
EMDR is not necessarily steady, but is adjusted on the basis of the
tracking abilities of a client. Additionally, rescripting and EMDR are not
limited to a set number of trials and time, though several studies have
indicated lab-based EMDR sessions can be successful in reducing the
vividness and/or the emotionality an aversive memory (Leer et al.,
2014; van den Hout, Bartelski, & Engelhard, 2012). Furthermore, the
time frame in which the events took place does not resemble a real
traumatic experience. In real life a traumatic event is rarely treated the
same day. It is even more unlikely that the dreaded event unexpectedly
is re-experienced the next day. However, the current experimental set
up does allow a comparison between different intervention techniques
without interfering variables as type of aversive experience and inter-
vention duration. As such it can contribute to knowledge about acqui-
sition and treatment of fear (see for the usefulness of fear extinction as
experimental tool Graham & Milad, 2011).
A second limitation is the number of drop-outs. In total nine parti-
cipants discontinued the experiment and nineteen participants were
labelled as contingency unaware. Although we did not want the US to
habituate, a slightly less aversive US might be used for future studies.
As especially the loud screaming was reported as aversive and sensiti-
zation rather than habituation took place, a lower volume might give
similar results. Regarding contingency awareness, we used a partial
reinforcement schedule to prevent fast extinction during the non-re-
inforced reinstatement test. However, for future research we would
recommend using a continuous schedule to enhance contingency
awareness.
Thirdly, CS3 (CS-) and CS1 (CS+) were spaced in time for the EXT
group. This set up differs from other extinction experiments where CS+
and CS- trials are mixed. A sequential presentation of CS- and CS
+ might have influenced test results. For example, the prediction error
might be smaller if series of non-reinforced CS+ trials are presented in
a row; the upcoming and previous CSs are equal, making the series of
trials more predictable and, thereby, reducing the amount of surprise.
This reduction in prediction error, might in turn, result in less in-
hibitory learning (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). In a follow up study it
would be interesting to test if this assumption is true by mixing non-
reinforced CS+ and CS- trials versus serial presentations of the stimuli.
Another limitation is the lack of a control group that does not show
a change in US ratings after the intervention. It is possible that the mere
passage of time is responsible for this change; including a no inter-
vention control group would shed more light on this possibility.
A final limitation is that the current study is conducted in two days.
This set up does not allow investigating the intervention techniques on
consolidated memories as the intervention took immediately place after
fear acquisition. Results may be different if the intervention was sepa-
rated in time from the acquisition, using a three-day protocol.
Although the present study suffers from some limitations, it is the
first that directly compares two different working mechanisms that
each aim at reducing a (conditioned) fear response. The results indicate
that extinction is most successful in changing contingency expectancies,
whereas all interventions seem to reduce the mental representation of
an aversive event. For future studies we would suggest to examine the
combination of these different treatment techniques on fear reduction.
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